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The Social Security Administration’s Ticket to Work Program:
A Failed Return-to-Work Strategy
Julie Mavis
Grand Valley State University
Abstract
This article examines policies and programs aimed at reducing the number of people
UHFHLYLQJGLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWVE\KHOSLQJUHFLSLHQWVWUDQVLWLRQEDFNWRIXOOWLPHHPSOR\PHQW
The primary focus is the Social Security Administration’s Ticket to Work Program,
ZKLFKKDVKDGDYHU\SURRUWUDFNUHFRUGIRUUHWXUQLQJSHUVRQVUHFHLYLQJGLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWV
back to the workforce. Various alternative approaches are explored, with the intent of
providing recommendations for strengthening efforts to more successfuly reintegrate people
back into the workforce.
Keywords: Social Security Administration, disability policy, work incentives
The disabled population in the United States is growing, based on
the numbers of disability recipients receiving Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) payments. As of late 2014, over ten million people are
UHFHLYLQJGLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWV7KHVROXWLRQIURP&RQJUHVVWRDWWHPSWWR
return disability recipients back to the workforce came in the form of
legislation called the Ticket to Work and Work Incentive Improvement Act
of 1999. The goal was to use work incentives and access to employment
service agencies to transition disability recipients back into sustained
employment that would remove them from the disability rolls.
Despite the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) best efforts, only
about 2% of disability recipients are taking advantage of the Ticket to
Work incentives (Livermore & Roche, 2011). Surveys and studies report
the major obstacle for the program is overcoming the disability recipients’
fear of losing their guaranteed monthly income checks and healthcare
EHQHÀWVLI WKH\FKRRVHWRWUDQVLWLRQEDFNLQWRWKHZRUNIRUFH7KRVHZKR
utilize the Ticket to Work vocational services also encounter barriers, in that
vocational resource professionals are not responsive to their needs. SSA
reformed their Ticket to Work reimbursement strategies and monitoring
of ticket holder progress in 2008. As a result, the number of recipients
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using their tickets increased but this still did not translate into full-time
employment for these ticket users.
Scholars, policy experts and government agencies have offered
alternative strategies to increase the disability recipients exiting the
disability rolls back into the workforce. Alternatives explored in this
paper include disability reforms practiced in European nations, private
insurance disability models and multiple SSA reform pilots. Each of the
different models offers different strategies such as focusing on working
with the disabled worker prior to the initial government disability
application, offering short term disability options, working with employers
to accommodate employees with disabilities and to encourage returnto-work strategies. Without policy intervention to increase the return of
persons on the disability rolls back into the workforce, Ticket to Work
failures will continue to plague SSA, and the number of persons receiving
GLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWVZLOOFRQWLQXHWRLQFUHDVH
86'LVDELOLW\2SWLRQV%DFNJURXQG
The Social Security Administration (SSA) provides oversight for the
Federal disability programs. There are two Federal disability programs,
the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), Title 2 of the Social
Security Act, which was established in 1953, and 2), the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program, Title 16 which was created in 1973
(http://www.ssa.gov). It is important to understand the policy history
and the differences in the eligibility requirements for applicants for these
two disability programs and the Ticket to Work as both SSDI and SSI
recipients are eligible to participate in the Ticket to Work Program.
SSDI Program
The Social Security taxes from current workers’ paychecks are used
WRSD\EHQHÀWVWR WKRVHZKRDUHUHFHLYLQJ66$UHWLUHPHQWFKHFNV
2) survivors (spouses and children) of workers who have passed away,
 GHSHQGHQWV FKLOGUHQ RI WKRVHUHFHLYLQJGLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWVDQG 
individuals who are eligible to receive SSDI disability payments (http://
www.ssa.gov). Those who receive retirement or SSDI checks as well as
0HGLFDUHLQVXUDQFHFRYHUDJHDUHFDOOHGEHQHÀFLDULHV66$SD\UROOWD[HV
DUHSODFHGLQDIXQGWRKHOSSD\WKHEHQHÀFLDULHVWKHLUVXUYLYRUVRU
dependents. Most Americans do not understand how the taxes are used
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WRSD\IRUDYDULHW\RI SURJUDPEHQHÀWVVXFKDVIRUFKLOGUHQRUVSRXVHV
and not just solely used for retirement or disability. Many individuals
erroneously believe that their SSA taxes are being held in a personal
account that is waiting for them when they retire or when they are
medically no longer able to work.
,QRUGHUWREHFRPHPHGLFDOO\HOLJLEOHIRUWKH66',EHQHÀWVDSHUVRQ
must have a physical or mental impairment that is expected to last for
12 months or longer, or that will result in death (http://www.ssa.gov).
A person applying for disability, called a claimant, cannot be working
and earning over a certain amount of income. Such income is called
Substantial Gainful Activity or SGA. SGA in 2017 is $1170 per month
(http://www.ssa.gov); the amount increases each year. Most claimants
eligible to apply for SSDI based on their levels of income earned are over
the age of 18.
,WLVGLIÀFXOWIRUPRVWGLVDELOLW\DSSOLFDQWVWRPHHWWKHVWULQJHQW
criteria to be deemed disabled. The Social Security Administration
statistics indicate between 2001 and 2010 the average approval rate for
disability at the initial application was only 28%. That percentage increases
VOLJKWO\LI DSHUVRQÀOHVIRUUHFRQVLGHUDWLRQDIWHUWKHLQLWLDODSSOLFDWLRQ
But if a person takes the next step after denial at the reconsideration
level to the administrative law judge (ALJ) the percentage increases to an
average of 66%. The primary barrier of appealing to the ALJ level is the
length of time it takes to have a hearing scheduled. In 2015 the average
processing time for a hearing was 463 days (http://www.oig.ssa.gov).
:KHQDFODLPDQWLVDSSURYHGIRU66',EHQHÀWVWKH\ZLOOUHFHLYHPRQWKO\
checks and after two years they also become eligible to receive Medicare
insurance coverage.
SSI Program
The SSI program is not funded by Social Security taxes. It was created
as a supplemental income program to assist those disabled adults and
children who have little or no income. An adult applying for SSI must
PHHWVSHFLÀFLQFRPHDQGUHVRXUFHFULWHULD7KHGHÀQLWLRQRI GLVDELOLW\LV
the same for the SSI program for adults. Those applying for SSI must also
not be working and earning over SGA just as in the SSDI program. The
monthly checks SSI recipients received are a set amount each month and
adjusted annually. In 2017, SSI recipients receive $735 for individuals and
$1,103 for a couple (hhtps://www.ssa.gov).
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Ticket to Work Program
The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 was
created by Congress to provide programs for SSDI and SSI disability
recipients who wanted to return to the workforce. In preparing to
implement this legislation, SSA reached out to the disability community
through roundtable discussions, conferences and meetings with
researchers and budget analysts in order to create this legislation to
encourage disability recipients to utilize employment services. Included
in this legislation were programs designed to address the fear of SSDI
and SSI disability recipients about losing their Medicare and Medicaid
coverage if they returned to work. In addition, the legislation provided
enhancements to pre-existing SSA work incentive programs, including
creating the Ticket to Work Program. Work incentives are regulations that
permit SSDI and SSI disability recipients to receive access to employment
support services or training and permit them to work and earn income for
DGHÀQHGSHULRGEHIRUHORVLQJWKHLUGLVDELOLW\FDVKDQGLQVXUDQFHEHQHÀWV
Other sections of the regulations included funding community-based
organizations that can provide work incentives and assistance to disability
recipients, funding advocacy services for disability recipients and piloting
work incentive projects for SSDI recipients (https://yourtickettowork.
com/web/ttw/history). The overall goal of the Ticket to Work program
was to transition SSI and SSDI disability recipients off the government
rolls and thereby reduce the cost of the disability programs. This was
to be accomplished by offering employment services and support to
assist disability recipients to prepare for work. The recipients would
receive education and training in new work-related skills, to re-enter the
workforce through resume writing and other job search and job placement
assistance, and eventually help the recipients to maintain employment
DJDLQ6XFKVHUYLFHVZHUHLQWHQGHGWRLQFUHDVHWKHVHOIVXIÀFLHQF\RI 66',
DQG66,GLVDELOLW\UHFLSLHQWVE\UHSODFLQJWKHLUFDVKGLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWVZLWK
their own work earnings (http://www.choosework.net/about/faqs/index.
html).
The Ticket to Work program is free and voluntary for SSI and SSDI
disability recipients who are between the ages of 18 and 64. Previously
SSA mailed out paper tickets to SSDI and SSI recipients alerting them of
their eligibility to participate in the program. Currently, those interested
in participating can contact The Ticket to Work Help Line, where they
will receive assistance through the process. SSA sometimes refers to those
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participating in the Ticket to Work program as a ticket holder.
Employment networks and vocational rehabilitation agencies. A ticket
holder has access to two main services depending on their work-related
needs: an Employment Network (EN) or a Vocational Rehabilitation
(VR) agency. An Employment Network (EN) can include employers,
public or private vocational support agencies that offer services such as
vocational counseling and job placement. They typically do not provide
in-depth vocational training programs. The EN can choose whether to
work with an individual ticket holder or not, depending on the ticket
holder’s needs. The ENs specialize in career planning, job leads and
SODFHPHQWVRQJRLQJHPSOR\PHQWVXSSRUWEHQHÀWVFRXQVHOLQJDQGRIWHQ
are part of a State’s public workforce system. An EN offered through the
State system is called a Workforce Employment Network or WF (https://
choosework.net/about/your-path-to-work/index.html#2).
If a ticket holder has been out of the workforce for some time due
to their disability or requires re-training to learn a new type of skill,
then Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) services offered through each State
is a better path to take. The VRs offer much more intensive training,
education and rehabilitation along with career counseling, job placement
DVVLVWDQFHDQGEHQHÀWVFRXQVHOLQJ KWWSVFKRRVHZRUNQHWDERXW\RXU
path-to-work/index.html#2).
A ticket holder may require the assistance of both a VR and an
EN, based on their need for more intensive services. For example, if a
ticket holder needs to complete education or participate in a long-term
skill training experience, they would work through the VR. Once their
retraining and skill development education is complete, they may transfer
to an EN for assistance with job placement and ongoing employment
support. A VR typically will close a case once a ticket holder starts to
work, whereas an EN will provide assistance through the work experience
in order to encourage long-term employment (https://www.choosework.
net/library/partnership-plus).
The ENs and VRs are compensated for assisting the ticket holder
when employment milestones or employment is achieved. Each ticket
holder will work with their agency to create an individual work plan
ZLWKVSHFLÀFJRDOV7KHHQGJRDORI WKHSODQLVWRDFKLHYHÀQDQFLDO
independence through sustained work activity and earned income.
6SHFLÀFJRDOVFDQLQFOXGHFRPSOHWLQJHGXFDWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQWVZLWKLQ
VSHFLÀFWLPHIUDPHVRUUHDFKLQJVSHFLÀFZRUNLQFRPHOHYHOV66$
monitors progress toward these goals to determine if “timely progress”
is being met. If timely progress goals are met, the EN or VN is
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compensated for their services. (https://www.choosework.net/about/
how-it-works/index.html).
If a ticket holder is working with a VR or an EN, the continuing
disability medical review (CDR) is not used to determine whether they
remain disabled. Prior to this legislation, a CDR review was triggered
whenever an SSI or SSDI disability recipient returned to work and
began to earn income again. In the event that the SSI or SSDI recipient’s
PHGLFDOFRQGLWLRQVZHUHIRXQGWRKDYHVKRZHGVLJQLÀFDQWPHGLFDO
LPSURYHPHQWGXULQJD&'5WKHLULQFRPHDQGKHDOWKFDUHEHQHÀWV
were terminated. Not having an automatic CDR upon returning to
employment was viewed as a major incentive by legislators and SSA.
Other Work Incentive Programs
Other work incentive programs exist for SSDI and SSI recipients.
Other provisions of the Ticket to Work legislation relevant to this article
were work incentives entitled 7ULDO:RUN3HULRG 7:3 , Extended Period
RI (OLJLELOLW\ (3( and ([SHGLWHG5HLQVWDWHPHQW (;5 . Each of these
programs is important to understand, as they are intended to help SSDI
RU66,SDUWLFLSDQWVUHWDLQWKHLUGLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWVLQWKHHYHQWWKDWWKH\DUH
unable to continue working after having returned, and to avoid the need
WRVWDUWRYHUE\KDYLQJWRÀOHDQHZGLVDELOLW\DSSOLFDWLRQ
7ULDOZRUNSHULRGThe TWP is for SSDI recipients only and allows
them to work and earn over the SSA income guidelines, for any nine
months during a 60-month rolling period. The TWP wage in 2017 is $840
gross per month (https://www.ssa.gov). The SSDI recipient is required to
report their income to SSA once work begins, to enable SSA to track how
much is being earned. If a SSDI recipient starts working and earns over
the TWP wage for six months but has to stop due to their disability, they
ZLOOQRWORVHWKHLUFDVKRULQVXUDQFHEHQHÀWVDVWKH\KDYHRQO\FRPSOHWHG
six months of their TWP. They can work another three months during
that rolling 60-month period and still have those months count as part
of their TWP. If work stops, it must be due to their disability and not
for other reasons. If the work continues for nine months, then SSA will
determine if the earnings are over Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA)
gross income. For 2017, SGA limits are $1,170/month for non-blind
individuals and $1,950/month for blind individuals. If the income is over
WKLVOLPLWWKHQWKH66',UHFLSLHQW·VEHQHÀWVFDQEHWHUPLQDWHG https://
www.ssa.gov/redbook/documents/TheRedBook2017.pdf.).
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([WHQGHGSHULRGRI HOLJLELOLW\ (3(  The EPE begins at the
HQGRI WKHÀUVWPRQWKDIWHUWKH7:3HQGVDQGLVDYDLODEOHWRWKHIRUPHU
SSDI disability recipient for the next 36 months. If the former recipient
earns below the SGA limit for a month or stops working due to their
GLVDELOLW\66$ZLOOUHLQVWDWHWKHLUEHQHÀWVGXULQJWKLV(3(SHULRG7KH
former disability recipient should be reporting their earnings to SSA and
must have stopped or reduced their work due to their disability. If these
FULWHULDDUHPHWWKH\DUHQRWUHTXLUHGWRUHDSSO\IRUEHQHÀWVDQGWKH\ZLOO
UHFHLYHWKHLUSUHYLRXVFDVKDQGLQVXUDQFHEHQHÀWVRQFHZRUNKDVVWRSSHG
(https://www.ssa.gov/redbook/documents/TheRedBook2017.pdf).
([SHGLWHGUHLQVWDWHPHQW (;5  An EXR is available to both
former SSDI and SSI disability recipients. Former recipients are eligible
IRUXSWRÀYH\HDUVZKHQEHQHÀWVHQGGXHWRWKHLUGLVDELOLW\$IRUPHU
recipient can apply for an EXR and receive up to six months of cash
EHQHÀWVZKLOHWKHLUFDVHXQGHUJRHVDPHGLFDOUHYLHZ$PHGLFDOUHYLHZ
is required to determine if work was stopped due to the same or related
PHGLFDOFRQGLWLRQVIRUZKLFKWKH\RULJLQDOO\UHFHLYHGGLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWV
For example, if a person was allowed disability for a back impairment,
but they started working and went through their TWP and EPE but had
WRVWRSZRUNGXHWRDVWURNHWKH\ZRXOGQRWEHHOLJLEOHWRUHFHLYHEHQHÀWV
DJDLQWKURXJKWKH(;5SURFHVV7KLVSHUVRQZRXOGKDYHWRÀOHDQHZ
disability claim since the stroke was not related to the back impairment
(https://www.ssa.gov/redbook/documents/TheRedBook2017.pdf).
&RQFHUQVZLWK7LFNHWWR:RUN9LDELOLW\
The SSDI and SSI approval process can be lengthy. Once the
EHQHÀFLDU\VWDUWVUHFHLYLQJWKHLQFRPHDQGKHDOWKFDUHEHQHÀWVWKHUHLV
a fear that returning to any level of work activity may jeopardize those
EHQHÀWV7KLVZDVFRQÀUPHGWKURXJKWKH1DWLRQDO%HQHÀFLDU\
Study that found that the primary reason recipients earned less than they
ZHUHFDSDEOHRI HDUQLQJZDVLQRUGHUWRNHHSWKHLUFDVKEHQHÀWVDQG
healthcare insurance (Livermore, Mamun, Schimmel & Prenovitz, 2013).
A critical component of the Ticket to Work program is the need for
SSDI and SSI recipients who are working to report their income to their
ORFDO66$RIÀFH$VGHVFULEHGDERYHWKHUHLVDOLPLWDVWRKRZPXFK
SSDI recipients can earn while working (SSI recipients can earn even
OHVV LQRUGHUWRUHFHLYHWKHLUIXOOEHQHÀWV,I WKH\GRQRWUHSRUWWKHLU
income they risk receiving an “overpayment” determination from SSA.
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An overpayment comes about when a SSDI recipient’s work income
exceeds the SGA wage limits and the person has continued to receive
WKHLUPRQWKO\66',FDVKEHQHÀWDORQJZLWKWKHLUZRUNLQFRPH$VDUHVXOW
of such overpayments, the SSDI recipient will be ordered to repay the
overage back to SSA. This is a risk many SSDI recipients do not want to
take.
Since 2004 all states have implemented the Ticket to Work program
but it has shown poor results with only about 2 percent of disability
recipients participating in the program (Livermore & Roche, 2011). This
is a problem that continues to be investigated by scholars, legislators and
policy experts. This paper investigates the barriers to the program for the
population this program serves, and for the Federal, State, and private
VWDNHKROGHUV7KHUHVHDUFKFRPSOHWHGRQWKLVWRSLFLGHQWLÀHVDOWHUQDWLYHV
to answer the core research question: Is there a better model than the
current Ticket to Work program that could be more successful in getting
SSDI recipients to return to the workforce, and reduce the disability rolls
in the US?
Ticket to Work Program Outcomes
&RVWDQG9LDELOLW\&KDOOHQJHV
The feedback regarding barriers experienced by these stakeholders
should be considered by SSA and Congress to determine what changes
to the policy are needed. Concerns from a variety of stakeholders and
interest groups, including Congress, triggered the US Government
$FFRXQWDELOLW\2IÀFH *$2 WRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHSURJUDPWRGHWHUPLQH
its cost and viability. In 2011, the GAO investigation found that low
participation rates and program costs were not offset by participants
returning to work. The study found that the low participation and
low rates of return-to-work was due in part to the following: Many
Employment Networks (ENs) were not actively participating with ticket
holders in providing services or extended job placements; and, 2) SSA
did not have effective management tools for evaluating the approach
or progress between the ENs and ticket holders. SSA lacked a system
for monitoring participants using the ticket. Since these ticket holders
were not undergoing medical reviews (CDRs) that would determine if
WKH\UHPDLQHGGLVDEOHG66$FRQWLQXHGEHQHÀWSD\PHQWVWRLQHOLJLEOH
recipients whose medical conditions had improved. As such there were
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VRPHSDUWLFLSDQWVIRUZKRPDSSURSULDWHWHUPLQDWLRQRI EHQHÀWVGLG
not occur (GAO, 2011). In response to the GAO study, SSA developed
performance measures for ENs and implemented a tracking system for
EN services to ensure consistency with program goals.
8QLQWHQGHG&RQVHTXHQFHVRI 7LFNHWWR:RUN
The 2011 GAO study brought to light other unintended
consequences of the Ticket to Work program. Some ENs encouraged
ticket holders to maintain part-time work in order to retain their disability
EHQHÀWV7KLVDGYLFHZDVFRQWUDU\WRWKHSURJUDPJRDORI WUDQVLWLRQLQJ
the ticket holders into full-time work and off the disability rolls.
Subsequently, SSA implemented payment progress milestones for ENs in
2008. The payment to the ENs now depends on the ticket holder’s length
of employment, earnings and how many months a recipient does not
UHFHLYHEHQHÀWVGXHWRKLJKHUHDUQLQJV
)RUWKHWLFNHWKROGHUWKHFHUWDLQW\RI VWDEOHGLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWV
compared to the uncertainty in an employment situation is the major
obstacle of the program. Studies show that being employed full-time
through Ticket to Work is the exception rather than the rule (Lawler,
 7KHGLVDELOLW\SRSXODWLRQFDQEHGLIÀFXOWWRHPSOR\GXHWRFKURQLF
health conditions but the bigger issue is the potential loss of economic
security derived from their disability payments. Another barrier for ticket
holders is the income reporting requirement, and the potential loss of
EHQHÀWVDQGWKHSRWHQWLDOUHTXLUHPHQWWRUHSD\WKHLQFRPHRYHUDJH
These two factors are reason enough for ticket holders, no matter what
their age, to avoid work (Olney & Lyle, 2011).
A challenge for ENs is their need to select the appropriate ticket
holders to work with on their individual work plan. The ticket holder and
the EN agree to work with each other to ensure that the EN provides
the appropriate job-related services. There is extensive information
available on the SSA website related to selecting the correct provider for
the level of assistance needed by the ticket holder (http://choosework.
net/about/your-path-to-work/ready-to-work.html). The match between
an EN and a ticket holder is importantfor the EN because if they are
not successful in guiding the ticket holder toward their goals within a
VSHFLÀHGWLPHIUDPHWKH\GRQ·WJHWFRPSHQVDWHGIRUWKHLUVHUYLFHV7KH\
could spend their time and resources with a ticket holder but still get no
payment if that individual’s goals are not met.
60

Ticket to Work
The VRs can also be impacted by the outcomes for the Ticket to
Work program. Prior to implementation of Ticket to Work, state VRs
received referrals from SSA whenever a person was granted disability
EHQHÀWV7KHUHZHUHQRIRUPDOSURJUDPRXWFRPHPHDVXUHVIRUWKH95V
to meet in tracking the transition of SSDI or SSI recipients back to
work. Without formal reporting requirements, there was no tracking of
VR participants who were re-entering the workforce or on a decreased
dependence on SSDI funds (Burns, 2013). With Ticket to Work, SSA
introduced competition to the VRs, as ENs are also utilized to provide
work services for ticket holders. Some VRs saw this availability of ENs to
the ticket holders as a threat to their funding and a potential decrease in
their customer base with (Kregel and Revell, 2003). Currently the VRs can
elect to get paid by SSA through the traditional reimbursement program
or through the similar outcome based milestones used by ENs. In
crafting this policy, it was thought that with the now competitive market
with ENs, VRs would improve their performance while doing a better
job of providing for the needs of the ticket holders than the private
organizations. The VR services are dependent on state level funding
DQGDYDLODELOLW\RI DTXDOLÀHGZRUNIRUFH7KH95VDOVRIDFHFRQÁLFWLQJ
priorities, as they also participate with providing services to state welfare
to work recipients. With the competition of private ENs the state VRs
could see a reduction of their ticket holder services which in turn could
impact their reimbursement revenue (Kregel and Revell, 2003).
Alternatives to Ticket to Work Program
There are several policy alternatives to Ticket to Work that have
been researched, recommended and piloted by SSA and other entities.
Such alternatives programs have been included here to assess whether
they have improved outcomes in transitioning disability recipients back
into a successful employment situation and off the disability rolls. SSA
has piloted several models to improve the rate of return-to-work and the
nature of that experience for the disabled workers; European models
KDYHKDGVLJQLÀFDQWO\GLIIHUHQWDSSURDFKHVZKLFK\LHOGSRVLWLYHUHVXOWV
related to return-to-work; and the private disability insurance models also
show success in this area.
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SSA Alternatives
SSA has piloted three alternatives to determine if additional
work incentives would increase the return-to-work rates in disability
UHFLSLHQWV7KH$FFHOHUDWHG%HQHÀWVGHPRQVWUDWLRQWKH:RUN,QFHQWLYH
6LPSOLÀFDWLRQ3LORWDQGWKH%HQHÀW2IIVHW1DWLRQDO'HPRQVWUDWLRQZHUH
three pilot attempts by SSA at improving the outcomes of the Ticket to
Work program.
$FFHOHUDWHGEHQHÀWV 7KH$FFHOHUDWHG%HQHÀWV $% DOWHUQDWLYH
was studied by MDRC with funding from SSA (Bailey & Weathers III,
2014). This research involved tracking recent SSDI recipients who were
placed into three study groups. A control group who was not provided
immediate access to healthcare since the standard approach now is a
WZR\HDUZDLWIRU0HGLFDUHHOLJLELOLW\IRU66',EHQHÀFLDULHV$VHFRQG
AB group was provided immediate access to health care and a third
AB Plus group was provided both immediate employment services as
well as immediate access to healthcare. The AB Plus study group not
only had access to healthcare and employment services but also had the
opportunity to go through a series of classes for ten weeks. These classes
were designed to reduce the psychosocial barriers to the rehabilitative
process, increase quality of life, and education into SSA work incentives
DQGKRZHDUQLQJVLPSDFWEHQHÀWVDQGSURPRWLQJUHHQWU\LQWRZRUNDQG
life activities. The AB group was able to use the immediate access to
healthcare to treat and stabilize their medical conditions. The AB plus
group who had access to the classes, health insurance and employment
services took advantage of their healthcare options and also participated
in employment services.
Unfortunately, there was no increase in employment rate of either
group after a year of monitoring their progress. Although medically the
GLVDELOLW\UHFLSLHQWVZHUHEHQHÀWLQJIURPWKHDFFHOHUDWHGVHUYLFHVLWGLG
not impact or increase their return to employment. This type of system
would likely be implemented by SSA working with state agencies and ENs
WRVFKHGXOHWKHFODVVHVHGXFDWLQJEHQHÀFLDULHVRQWKHLUKHDOWKFDUHRSWLRQV
under the new Affordable Care Act (ACA) legislation as well as providing
the employment services. There would need to be a coordination of
services between the states and SSA to ensure the components of this
type of system are implemented accurately.
:RUN,QFHQWLYH6LPSOLÀFDWLRQ3LORW SSA’s Work Incentive
6LPSOLÀFDWLRQ3LORW :,63 ZDVVWXGLHGE\0DWKHPDWLFD3ROLF\5HVHDUFK
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in 2012. Mathematica provided a Technical Advisory Panel (TAP) to
provide recommendations to SSA regarding the intended or unintended
FRQVHTXHQFHVDQGEHQHÀWVRI WKHSLORW:,63ZDVDSLORWSURJUDPWR
WHVWWKHHIÀFLHQF\RI WKH66$·VZRUNLQFHQWLYHV)RUH[DPSOHLI GLVDELOLW\
recipients were participating in WISP, their monthly checks could be
suspended for work activity above the wage limit for disabled workers,
EXWWKHLUEHQHÀWVZHUHnot terminated for work. Medicare coverage also
FRQWLQXHGLQGHÀQLWHO\XQOHVVWKHLUEHQHÀWVZHUHWHUPLQDWHGIRUVRPH
other reason (Wittenburg, Mann & Stepleton, 2012). The expected
EHQHÀWVRI WKH:,63ZHUHDGHFUHDVHLQ66$DGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRVWVDQGDQ
improvement in recipient outcomes related to return to employment. If
successful, WISP’s provisions would eventually replace SSDI’s existing
system for reporting and developing the worker’s earnings, which has
shown to be a complex and ineffective process. The TAP made several
recommendations to SSA regarding the feasibility of nationwide
implementation of the program but did not provide important
guidance in areas where the “optimal evaluation design is dependent on
operational design” (Wittenburg, Mann, & Stepleton, p. 28). No further
implementation or research regarding WISP has been conducted and it
appears that the pilot ended after 2012.
%HQHÀW2IIVHW1DWLRQDO'HPRQVWUDWLRQSSA also implemented
WKH%HQHÀW2IIVHW1DWLRQDO'HPRQVWUDWLRQ %21' WRWHVWWKH
HIIHFWLYHQHVVRI EHQHÀWRIIVHWDQGHQKDQFHGEHQHÀWFRXQVHOLQJWRDGGUHVV
low return-to-work rate of disability recipients. This demonstration or
pilot started in 2012 and used volunteer and non-volunteer disability
recipients to participate. Under current program rules, disability recipients
ORVHDOOWKHLU66$EHQHÀWVDIWHUDVXVWDLQHGSHULRGRI HDUQLQJLQFRPHRYHU
DVSHFLÀHGDPRXQWDQGULVNSRWHQWLDOORVVRI RWKHU QRQ66', EHQHÀWV
This loss of earnings is sometimes called the “cash cliff.” Research has
shown it discourages some disability recipients from working at all and
HQFRXUDJHVWKRVHZKRFRXOGZRUNZLWKHDUQLQJVDERYHWKHVSHFLÀHG
level to keep their earnings below that amount. BOND replaces the cash
FOLII ZLWKD´UDPSµ EHQHÀWRIIVHW DQGDSROLF\REMHFWLYHRI HQFRXUDJLQJ
GLVDELOLW\UHFLSLHQWVZKRFDQZRUNDERYHWKHVSHFLÀHGLQFRPHOHYHOWR
LQFUHDVHWKHLUHDUQLQJVDQGUHGXFHWKHLUUHOLDQFHRQGLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWV
(Wittenburg, Mann, Stepleton, Gubits, Judkins & McGruirk, 2015). The
EHQHÀWRIIVHWUHGXFHVEHQHÀWVE\IRUHYHU\LQFRXQWDEOHDQQXDO
HDUQLQJVLQH[FHVVRI DVSHFLÀHG\HDUO\DPRXQWDIWHUDFHUWDLQWLPHIUDPH
versus removing them entirely per the current work incentive policy.
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The most recent results in 2015 have shown there is no impact on
HDUQLQJVDQGDFWXDOO\VKRZHGLWOHGWRDQLQFUHDVHLQEHQHÀWVSDLGWRWKH
SDUWLFLSDQWDVDUHVXOWRI WKHGHPRQVWUDWLRQ7KHVHÀQGLQJVDUHFULWLFDO
for this work incentive demonstration. Without showing results that lead
WRDQLQFUHDVHLQHDUQLQJVWKHEHQHÀWRIIVHWKDGWKHQHJDWLYHRXWFRPH
RI OHDGLQJWRKLJKHUEHQHÀWVSDLGWRWKHZRUNLQJGLVDELOLW\UHFLSLHQWV
FRPSDUHGWRWKHEHQHÀWVSDLGZLWKRXWWKHRIIVHW :LWWHQEXUJHWDO 
The results show that even the incentive of not having to lose all disability
FDVKEHQHÀWVZKLOHZRUNLQJXQIRUWXQDWHO\KDGQRLPSDFWRQLQFUHDVLQJ
the likelihood of a participant to return to a work situation that would
GHFUHDVHWKHUHOLDQFHRI GLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWV
SSA has attempted multiple pilot and demonstrations projects over
the years to increase the return-to-work rate of the disability recipients. As
these three examples show, to date none are found to make a difference in
long-term return-to-work success.
(XURSHDQPRGHOV Other alternatives offered in research published
by Olney and Lyle (2011) and Burkhauser, Daly, McVicar, and Wilkins
(2014) support the European disability insurance models. The European
programs have undergone reform over the years. Successful changes
include triaging the vocational rehabilitation system to ensure appropriate
YRFDWLRQDOVHUYLFHVUHGXFLQJEHQHÀWVLI ZRUNHUVGRQ·WSDUWLFLSDWHLQ
vocational rehabilitation and making employers more accountable to
working more with their disabled workers through accommodations or
rehabilitation.
Lessons learned or recommendations in this research highlight the
fact that the US disability policy focuses on creating an environment of
ORQJWHUPEHQHÀWV versus preventing workers from entering the growing disability
rolls. Burkhauser et al. (2014) suggests the US should learn from the
disability reform efforts European countries have invested in. They focus
their efforts on providing incentives and disincentives to the employees
and employers for participation in the disability process. For example,
in Sweden and Great Britain, if those on disability do not participate
LQYRFDWLRQDOVHUYLFHVRUUHKDELOLWDWLRQWKHLUEHQHÀWVDUHUHGXFHGRU
eliminated. The Netherlands reduced their disability rolls by making
employers take more responsibility for more of the direct costs of the
GLVDELOLW\SURJUDPE\KDYLQJWKHPIXQGWKHÀUVWWZR\HDUVRI GLVDELOLW\
EHQHÀWV,QDGGLWLRQWKHHPSOR\HUVDUHUHTXLUHGWRSD\DQH[SHULHQFH
rated disability tax based on the number of their workers who move into
the long-term disability program (Burkhauser, Daly & Lucking, 2013).
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The European models also promote earlier employment intervention
EHIRUHWKHLQGLYLGXDOJRHVRQSHUPDQHQWGLVDELOLW\RUZLWKLQWKHÀUVW
\HDURI SHUPDQHQWGLVDELOLW\VWDWXV7KHSURJUDPVÀQGWKDWHPSOR\PHQW
intervention strategies of three, six, and twelve months within the
onset of disability has increased the return-to-work rate of the worker
compared to strategies that are taken after a person has been in the
disability system for a number of years (Burkhauser, et al, 2013). A
FRQVHTXHQFHRI WKHVHW\SHVRI (XURSHDQV\VWHPVFDQEHWKHVLJQLÀFDQW
cost of implementation of such programs. European models pay two to
six times as much per person as in the United States (Olney & Lyle, 2011).
But the return of the investment is higher return-to-work rates which
result in greater tax revenue and less dependence on public programs.
3ULYDWHGLVDELOLW\LQVXUDQFHPRGHOV The differences between
private disability insurers and the Federal disability program are included
here, as private disability insurance systems have higher return-to-work
rates compared to the Ticket to Work outcomes (Scism, 2013). Autor and
Duggan (2010) created a proposal that recommends using the private
disability insurance (PDI) model to update the US disability system.
The PDI model is based on private sector systems that offer employers
large scale employment support and work incentives to the employee
and employer. They propose that PDI can be available to workers just as
unemployment insurance and workman’s compensation is offered now.
The PDI model becomes involved with the disabled worker 90 days
after onset and up to two years of being off work. During this time the
worker is offered vocational rehabilitation services, assistance in working
with the employer on the Americans with Disability Act’s reasonable
accommodation request while offering partial wage replacement. If after
22 months the worker is not employed or able to be accommodated, the
ZRUNSODFHZRXOGSURJUHVVWRÀOLQJIRU6RFLDO6HFXULW\GLVDELOLW\ $XWRU 
Dugan, 2010). This model would not pay for any medical costs since the
Affordable Care Act allows for access to insurance.
The projected outcomes for this type of model are better support
for workers to work with their employers on accommodating their
return-to-work and reducing the waste caused by too many resources
supporting workers in long-term disabled status. Bardos, Burak, and
Ben-Shalom (2015) highlighted the negative possibilities of this approach
for employers. One obstacle is the costs involved in returning disabled
employees to work. Smaller businesses will not be able to invest in this
alternative due to the limited number of employees. Also employers who
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UHO\RQKLJKOHYHOVRI SURGXFWLYLW\E\WKHLUVWDII ZRXOGQRWVHHWKHEHQHÀW
as they could not afford to lose the productivity of an accommodated
worker. Larger employers where high turnover is not a concern would
not be invested in this type of program. But from society’s point of view
and for the employees, the potential for return-to-work under the PDI
model creates an encouraging and supportive work environment with less
reliance on government assistance.
Application of Theory
Olney and Lyle’s (2011) research refers to the SSA disability program
creating a “culture of disablement” where there needs to be a “culture
of enablement” (p. 206). One of the alternatives that has the potential
to create this culture shift requires taking steps that focus on triaging the
disability approval process to incorporate vocational services. The model
would attempt to educate the disability applicants on skills and jobs they
could transition to with their disability versus having them enter the
disability rolls. It would reverse the current process of trying to encourage
those on disability to exit the roles with work activity; this process could
encourage those waiting on their disability approval or denial to attempt a
new type of job based on their current level of disability.
Currently SSA pays out $8.8 billion to disabled workers through
WKH66',SURJUDP 66$ $FFRUGLQJWRWKH1DWLRQDO%HQHÀFLDU\
6XUYH\DERXWRI GLVDELOLW\EHQHÀFLDULHVKDGWLFNHWVDVVLJQHG
in December 2010 (Livermore et al, 2013) and reports indicate only 1%
of these recipients are leaving the disability rolls each year (GAO, 2011).
SSA’s return-to-work strategy for their disabled recipients needs to change.
The SSA disability rolls continue to increase while the economic wellEHLQJRI WKRVHRQ)HGHUDOGLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWVFRQWLQXHVWRGHFOLQHDV
of SSI recipients live in poverty and 28% of SSDI-only recipients live in
poverty (Livermore & Bardos, 2014).
One alternative for improving Ticket to Work outcomes involves
triaging disability applicants and providing vocational services at the
time of application. This is similar to the European model researched
by Burkhauser et al (2013) where earlier vocational intervention prior
to the worker going on permanent disability showed positive outcomes.
Interventions at months three, six, and twelve after disability onset should
be attempted prior to the person being accepted into the disability rolls.
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This type of approach to those persons applying for SSA disability
EHQHÀWVZDVDWWHPSWHGLQWKH6WDWHRI 0LFKLJDQ7KLVVHFWLRQGHVFULEHV
some of the barriers and challenges that creating such an approach to
GLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWVZRXOGSRVHDWWKHVWDWHOHYHO
Michigan’s MRS/DDS/DHS Better Off Working Cooperative
In 2014, the State of Michigan’s Disability Determination Service
had the opportunity to participate in an initiative called Better Off
Working, led by Michigan’s Director of Human Services at that time.
The State stakeholders involved were the Department of Human
Services (DHS), Michigan Rehabilitation Services (MRS), Department
of Community Health, Department of Education, Bureau of Services
for the Visually Impaired (BSVI), DHS Legal and Policy units, and the
Disability Determination Service (DDS). Other stakeholders included in
this initiative were disability advocacy groups and employers who had a
successful model of employing disabled individuals.
After the DHS Director retired in 2014 the full initiative did not
continue, but one part of the effort continued on through a small
workgroup that included the DDS, MRS and BSVI. This group was
FKDUJHGZLWKFUHDWLQJDSURFHVVZKHUHE\WKRVHÀOLQJIRU)HGHUDOGLVDELOLW\
EHQHÀWVZHUHUHIHUUHGWRWKH6WDWH·V056GXULQJWKHLQLWLDO)HGHUDO
disability review process. This group informally named this project the
MRS/DDS/DHS Cooperative. The Cooperative team uncovered many
challenges to what was seemingly a simple change which included the
QHHGWRPDLQWDLQFRQÀGHQWLDOLW\RI WKRVHDSSO\LQJIRUGLVDELOLW\DQGWR
implement process-mapping for making the referrals.
7KHÀUVWFKDOOHQJHZDVWRSURWHFWFRQÀGHQWLDOLW\GXULQJWKHGLVDELOLW\
determination process, in line with Federal mandates related to HIPAA
DQG66$SROLFLHVRI SURWHFWLQJSHUVRQDOLGHQWLÀDEOHLQIRUPDWLRQ6LQFH
DDS administers a Federal program, they cannot disclose to MRS [a
VWDWHDJHQF\@ZKHQDSHUVRQKDVÀOHGIRU66$GLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWVZLWKRXW
receiving consent from the applicant. The SSA policies were reviewed;
in that process a release form was discovered that SSA had created for
disability applicants to sign to release their medical records when they
ZHUHUHTXHVWLQJUHIHUUDOVWR6WDWHDJHQFLHV7KHUHOHDVHIRUPÀWWKHUHIHUUDO
needs of this project, and thus resolved the obstacle of non-disclosure to
other State agencies.
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The next stage was to determine the viability of the model. This
was completed through a process mapping exercise, breaking down the
steps necessary to create a referral system between the two agencies.
The process map began at the point when an applicant applies for SSA
EHQHÀWVDQGWKH)HGHUDODJHQF\IRUZDUGVWKHGLVDELOLW\DSSOLFDWLRQWRWKH
DDS. Issues discussed included whether to refer all disabled applicants
from DDS to MRS or whether to set up other criteria for referrals, such
as an age requirement. There was also a concern that some applicants
would take the DDS’s attempt to refer them to MRS as a sign that they
DUHJRLQJWREHGHQLHGWKH)HGHUDOGLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWVDQGZLWKDSRVVLEOH
unintended consequence of the applicant choosing NOT to return the
release. The group decided to refer all adult applicants over the age of 18
with some exceptions (such as applicants on dialysis or diagnosed with
high grade cancers) who would not be referred. Once applicants were
DSSURYHGIRUWKH66',GLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWVWKH\ZHUHQRWWREHLQFOXGHGLQ
this process since they could participate in the Ticket to Work program
RQFHWKH\ZHUHUHFHLYLQJ66$GLVDELOLW\EHQHÀWV66$SROLFLHVSURKLELW
States from referring SSA allowances to their own State vocational rehab
programs (SSA, 2013)
The process mapping team progressed to the point when a disability
case was assigned to a DDS disability examiner. The process would
involve each examiner sending an introductory letter to the applicant
explaining the overall disability process, and would offer a referral for
vocational rehabilitative services. The letter would also include a brochure
about MRS services, the SSA release form and an envelope for the
applicant to return the release form to DDS. A model letter with all this
language was created and approved by the workgroup to be used in the
process. When the applicant receives the letter, brochure, and release,
they could decide if they are interested in being offered services through
MRS and, if so, sign and return the release. The disability examiner would
UHFHLYHWKHUHOHDVHFRQÀUPLQJWKHLQWHUHVWDQGSODFHWKLVLQIRUPDWLRQLQ
the applicant’s disability claim folder. DDS could not send the referral
SULRUWRWKHÀQDOGHFLVLRQLQFDVHWKHDSSOLFDQWLVDSSURYHGGLVDELOLW\
EHQHÀWV7KHQDWWKHWLPHWKDWDGLVDELOLW\FDVHZDVGHQLHGWKH''6
would send the referral to MRS along with medical evidence that would
be helpful to MRS in identifying the severity of the applicant’s medical
conditions.
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At this point the mapping process stopped so that the workgroup
could discuss the referral process. MRS policy mandated that the disability
examiner have access to an appropriate referral form to send to MRS,
identifying the types of conditions and relevant medical records. This
information facilitates the MRS worker’s assessment of the limitations of
the applicant. DDS wanted the form to be user friendly and to require
limited input by the disability examiner. MRS and DDS created an
appropriate referral form that followed their State policies and required
limited effort for DDS staff.
Discussion took place regarding how the DDS would alert MRS of
the referral. The option included having DDS administrative support mail
the referral form and medical evidence to MRS. At this point a barrier was
LGHQWLÀHGUHODWHGWRKRZ''6VWDII FRXOGLGHQWLI\WRZKLFK056RIÀFH
WKH\VKRXOGVHQGWKHUHIHUUDO056RIÀFHVDUHQRWFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH
jurisdiction of which clients they serve, compared to the DDS. DDS has
IRXURIÀFHVVWDWHZLGHZKLOH056LVUHSUHVHQWHGLQPRVWFRXQWLHV7KLV
was followed by the topic of cost allocation in order to determine which
agency would be responsible for cost of mailings. SSA funds the DDS
program to support the Federal disability workload but does not offer
IXQGVWRVXSSRUWWKH0567KXV''6FRXOGQRWEHÀQDQFLDOO\UHVSRQVLEOH
IRUPDLOLQJVWKDWEHQHÀWDQRWKHUVWDWHDJHQF\LQRUGHUIRUDQDSSOLFDQW
WRUHFHLYH6WDWHVHUYLFHV$QRWKHUREVWDFOHLGHQWLÀHGDWWKLVSRLQWLQWKH
SURFHVVPDSSLQJZDVWKHFRQÀGHQFHWKH''6WHDPPHPEHUVKDGLQWKHLU
workers’ taking the extra time or even remembering that a referral was
QHHGHGDWWKHSRLQWWKHÀQDOGLVDELOLW\GHFLVLRQZDVPDGH,I WKHUHOHDVH
was received from the applicant at an early point in the process it would
EHHDV\WRPLVVWKHIRUPLQWKHHOHFWURQLFGLVDELOLW\ÀOH
The next step of the cost issue would have been creating a Memo
of Understanding between SSA and the State of Michigan regarding
the referral process and who would be responsible for cost. This was
the solution for a similar obstacle when the State of Michigan disability
program merged with the Federal disability program. Beginning in July
2015, State Medicaid and other State program disability applications are
now processed along with a SSI or SSDI disability applications. Due to
the absence of the DDS Director and a competing project needing the
priority of MRS staff, the Cooperative workgroup’s mission was put on
KROGLQGHÀQLWHO\%XWGXULQJWKHSURFHVVPDSSLQJHIIRUWWRFUHDWHDYLDEOH
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proposal, several obstacles surfaced regarding differences in policies
related to State and Federal mandates and cost allocation plans. Even
though the State and Federal agencies serve the same population and
assist them through disability or return-to-work strategies, their policies
DQGEXGJHWFDQSUHYHQWWKHPRVWFRVWHIÀFLHQWRUFXVWRPHUIULHQGO\
approaches. This group encountered on a small scale the obstacles
RI EXUHDXFUDFLHVUHODWHGWRFRQÁLFWLQJPDQGDWHVRI )HGHUDODQG6WDWH
programs.
Discussion
Research and studies discussed in this paper have supported a
change in the current SSA Ticket to Work program, as the program has
not shown an ability to deliver outcomes of returning the SSA disability
population to sustained employment. Several models and alternatives have
been suggested with results that show improved outcomes compared to
the current system. SSA has piloted different work incentive programs
without showing a successful model that supports a sustained returnWRZRUNH[SHULHQFHIRUGLVDEOHGEHQHÀFLDULHV5HVXOWVVXSSRUWGLVDEOHG
recipient’s fear of returning to work’s impact on their monthly checks
and insurance. Disabled workers were offered additional incentives of
healthcare access and vocational services or a decrease in the amount
of money removed from their checks while working and guaranteed
insurance. These options did not result in sustained employment for
that population and the SSA pilots were terminated or are being studied
further. European countries have undergone reform and have shown
improved return-to-work rates when there is intervention early on when
a worker becomes disabled or if incentives or disincentives are offered to
the worker and employer. There is a large cost for this type of approach,
so SSA has not embraced their models to date. Private disability insurance
models have been proposed with positive outcomes but it may not be a
viable solution for all employers based on cost, size of the employer or
productivity loss for the employer in having to accommodate workers.
The State of Michigan created a workgroup to explore a referral
process for vocational services during the disability review process that
would seem to be a successful model based on European models of
reaching out to workers earlier in the disability process to provide them
vocational services. Due to circumstances related to priorities, stakeholder
involvement, and cost this effort has been put on hold for now.
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SSA continues to struggle with the paradox of attempting to
encourage those who had to stop working to be eligible for disability
DQGÀQDOO\ZKHQDSSURYHG66$HQFRXUDJHVWKHPWRUHWXUQWRZRUN
According to the 2014 SSA Annual Statistical Supplement, there are
PLOOLRQGLVDEOHGEHQHÀFLDULHVUHFHLYLQJSD\PHQWVIURP66$,Q
December 2014, those payments totaled more than $11.4 billion. During
WKDWVDPHWLPHRQO\DERXWEHQHÀWVZHUHWHUPLQDWHGIRUGLVDEOHG
ZRUNHUV7KHVHQXPEHUVVKRZKRZWKHEHQHÀFLDULHVFRQWLQXHWRJURZ
ZKLOHWKHUHDUHDVPDOOQXPEHURI EHQHÀWVEHLQJWHUPLQDWHGGXHWR
work activity, medical improvement or other technical issues. Perhaps it
is SSA’s disability review process that needs to change versus providing
incentives for those currently on disability. The disability process itself is
a topic for research and Congressional oversight. One option that comes
up frequently is removing the continuing disability review process and
implementing time limits for recipients to receive disability payments. For
H[DPSOHGHSHQGLQJRQWKHPHGLFDOFRQGLWLRQDQGDJHRI WKHEHQHÀFLDU\
WLPHOLPLWVIRUGLVDELOLW\FRXOGEHRIIHUHGIRUWZRWRÀYH\HDUVDQG
WKHQEHQHÀWVDUHDXWRPDWLFDOO\WHUPLQDWHGZLWKRXWUHTXLULQJDPHGLFDO
review (Boccia, 2015). Ticket to Work might see an increase in services
EHLQJXWLOL]HGLI EHQHÀFLDULHVXQGHUVWRRGWKHLUEHQHÀWVZRXOGEHVKRUW
term versus long-term as the system currently works. This would take
SROLF\UHIRUPDQGWKHQDFRVWEHQHÀWDQDO\VLVRI WKHLPSDFWRI WKRVH
EHQHÀFLDULHVEHLQJWHUPLQDWHGZKRWKHQUHDSSO\IRUDQHZGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
As with other attempts for SSA reform, Congress must mandate any
changes based on long-term studies of the viability of the Ticket to Work
program.
Conclusion
SSA and their Ticket to Work program cannot afford to maintain
the status quo for the disability recipients. The news headlines continue
to remind us that the time is expiring on the Disability Trust Fund in the
IXWXUHZLWKWKHFRQVHTXHQFHRI GHOD\VRUUHGXFWLRQRI 66$EHQHÀWV
(Boccia, 2015). The Ticket to Work program was created to send disability
recipients back to work in order to decrease the number of recipients on
WKHGLVDELOLW\UROOV7KH1DWLRQDO%HQHÀFLDU\6XUYH\UHSRUWHGWKDW
15% of disability recipients were employed, seeking work or had been
employed during the previous year. Eighty-six percent of those working
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were limited to part-time employment in order not to lose their monthly
FDVKEHQHÀWVDQGLQVXUDQFH /LYHUPRUHHWDO $VDUHVXOWRI 
changes to the Ticket to Work program there was an increase from
61,000 recipients using their tickets in 2005 to 94,000 recipients in 2010.
Employment Networks were starting to see an increase in their revenue
compared to state vocational agencies as well (Livermore et al., 2013).
Unfortunately, these numbers did not translate into recipients returning to
IXOOWLPHZRUNDQGEHFRPLQJÀQDQFLDOO\LQGHSHQGHQW1XPEHUVLQ
showed that only 0.4% of eligible ticket holders had signed up with an
EN or VR and less than 1% of recipients eventually leave the disability
rolls to return-to-work in any given year (Boccia, 2015).
SSA continues to study, monitor and be challenged by these statistics,
but those who write the policies have not created a solution to the
FRQWUDGLFWRU\PHVVDJHV66$LVJLYLQJLWVUHFLSLHQWV66$ÀQGVDSSOLFDQWV
GLVDEOHGZKLFKLWGHÀQHVDVQRWEHLQJDEOHWRSHUIRUPDQ\W\SHRI ZRUN
but then they offer recipients a ticket to encourage them to return-toZRUN5HFLSLHQWVIHDUZRUNLQJIXOOWLPHDVWKHSUHFLRXVEHQHÀWVWKDW
took so long for them to get could be terminated. Or if earnings are not
reported accurately, SSA is quick to charge them with an overpayment.
Studies cited in this paper reinforce the strategy of triaging vocational
services and offering VR intervention earlier in the disability process
in order to promote realistic return-to-work scenarios. Models from
Europe and private insurance companies also have higher return-to-work
rates by triaging the disability recipients and working on return-to-work
goals as soon as a person starts the application process. The overall
goal for most disability applicants should be returning to work once the
medical conditions reach stability with treatment. But SSA’s disability
GHÀQLWLRQDQGDSSOLFDWLRQSURFHVVIRFXVRQQRWEHLQJDEOHWRSHUIRUP
any types of work due to the applicant’s medical conditions. Ideally, the
SSA disability program should be viewed as a limited term situation for
some applicants. But in the last few years the program has transformed
into a welfare program, a disablement program, where recipients are not
required to work and not encouraged to become independent to return as
a productive member of society.
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